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STATE OF NEW YORK 
SUPREME COURT 
In The Matter of TIMOTHY GOODE, 
-against-
NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF PAROLE, 
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. 
COUNT,Y OF ALBANY 
Petitioner, 
Respondent, 
Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Tenn 
Appearances: 
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding 
RJI # Ol-13-ST4719 Index No. 2542-13 
Timothy Goode 
Inmate No. 91-A-9536 
Petitioner, Pro Se 
Otisville Correctional Facility 
57 Sanitorium Avenue 
P.O. Box 8 
Otisville, NY 10963-2825 
Eric T. Schneiderman 
Attorney General 
State of New York 
Attorney For Respondent 
The Capitol 
Albany, New York 12224 
(Keith Muse, 
Assistant Attorney General 
of Counsel) 
DECISION/ORDER/JUDGMENT 
George B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice 
The petitioner: an inmate at Otisville Correctional Fa~.ility, has commenced the instant 
CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a detennination ofrespondent dated October 18, 2011 
to deny petitioner discretionary release on parole. Petitioner is serving an aggregate term of 
fifteen years to life upon conviction of attempted murder f st degree, criminal possession of 
a weapon, 2nd degree, burglary 1st degree and criminal use of a firearm. Among the many 
arguments set forth in the petition, petitioner indic~tes that he has an exemplary institutional 
recorq. He indicates that the has received certificates for. the following institutional 
programs: printing, optical, food management, nurses's a}d inmate liaison committee clerk, 
H.I.V. Counselor, Aggression Replacement Training and certifications for Blood Spill 
Cleanup, General Business ~nd Substance Abuse Aware~ress. He maintains that in 23 years 
of incarceration he has demonstrated that he poses no thr~1t to society. He cites letters of 
support from four correction officers and an Imam . .. He. alleges that the Parole Board's 
decision was arbitrary and capricious, irrational borderi 1:;g on impropriety, and made in 
violation of lawful procedure. He asserts that the Parole Board failed "to administer a 
COMPAS risk and needs assessment" as required under Executive Law§ 259-c (4). The 
foregoing, in his view, resulted in the violation of his du~ process rights. The petitioner 
contends that the Parole Board considered erroneous information in his prison record with 
regard to jail time credit. He indicates that his 2011 iruna!~ status report recites that his jail 
time was 248 months; his 2005 inmate status recites 189 months jail time credit; and his 
2009 inmate status report recites 224 months of jail time credit; and that these figures do not 
reconcile. He claims that his inmate record recites that he was convicted of more felonies 
than is the case. In his view, parole was denied based solely upon the seriousness of the 
instant offenses, without consideration of other statutor; fo.ctors. He also advances the 
following arguments: that the Parole Board improperly eonsidered his criminal history in 
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excess often years in the past; failed to consider his suc·ces};ful completion of work release; 
failed to consider the appropriate guideline range (see 9 NY CAA 8001.3. [ c ]); that the District 
Attorney's statements are not confidential under the Executive Law; that the Parole Board 
determination was not detailed. 
The reasons for the respondent's determination to dfJIY petitioner release on parole 
are set forth as follows: 
"Parole denied; next appearance October 2_013. 
"Following careful review and deliberation of your record and 
interview, this Panel concluded that discretionary release is not 
presently warranted due to concern for the public safety and 
welfare. The following factors were prop~rly weighed and 
considered: your iristant offense, in Nassau County, in February 
of 1991, involved your burglary· of a residence, wherein you 
exchanged gun fire with the police. Your criminal history 
indicates you were on parole at the time. about three months 
.from a 1987 burglary secon.d. Your institutional programing 
indicates progress and achievement, which is noted to your 
credit. Your disciplinary record reflects two· Tier II reports. 
You have approximately six felonies. This is your second state 
bid. Based on all required factors in the ·me considered, your 
discretionary release at this time \J\i-OUld thus not be compatible 
with the welfare of society at large and woulg tend to deprecate 
the seriousness of the instant offenses and undermine respect for 
the law. 
Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory 
requirements, not reviewable (Matter of Campbell v Evans, 106 AD3d 1363, 1363-1364 [3d 
Dept., 2013]; Matter of De La Cruz v Travis, 10 AD3d 789 [3d Dept., 2004]; Matter of 
Collado v New York State Division of Parole, 287 · AD2d 921 (3d Dept., 2001]). 
Furthermore, only a "showing of irrationality bordering on.impropriety" on the part of the 
Parole Board has been found to necessitate judicial intervention (see Matter of Silmon v 
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Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 (2000], quoting Matter of Russo i' . New York StateBd. of Parole, 
50 NY2d 69, 77 [1980]; see also Matter of Graziano v Evans, 90 AD3d 1367, 1369 [3d 
Dept., 2011]). In the absence of the above, there is no basis upon which to disturb the 
discretionary determination made by the Parole Board (see Matter of Perez v. New York 
State of Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 2002]). 
As relevant here, the 2011 amendments to the ExeC:µtive Law (see L 2011 ch 62, Part 
C, Subpart A,§ 38-b, et seq.) made two changes with respect to how parole determinations 
are made. Ffrst, Executive Law § 259-c was revised to eliminate mention of Division of 
Parole guidelines (see 9 NYCRR 8001.3 [a]), in favor of requiring the Division of Parole to 
rely upon criteria that would place greater emphasis on a<iSessing the degree to which inmates 
have been rehabilitated, and the probability that they would be able to remain crime-free if 
released (see Executive Law 259-c [4]). Said section now recites: "[t]he state board of 
parole shall [] ( 4) establish written procedures for its use in making parole decisions as 
required by law. Such written procedures shall incorporate risk and needs principles to 
measure the rehabilitation of persons appearing before the board, the likelihood of success 
of such persons upon release, and assist members of the state board of parole in determining 
which inmates may be released to parole supervision" (ExeGutive Law 259-c [ 4] , enacted in 
L 2011 ch 62, Part C, Subpart A, § 3 8-b ). This amendment was made effective six months 
after its adoption on March 31, 2011, that is, on October 1, 2011 (see L 2011, ch 62, Part C, 
Subpart A, § 49-[f]). In the second change, Executive 259-i (2) (c) was amended to 
incorporate into one section the eight factors which the Parole Board was to consider in 
making release determinations (see L 2011 ch 621 Part C, Subpart A, § 28-f-l). This 
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amendment was effective immediately upon its adoption on March 31, 2011 (~ L 2011, 
ch 62, Part C, Subpart A, § 49). Notably however, it did not result in a substantive change 
in the criteria which the Parole Board should consider in rendering its decision. 
Andrea W. Evans, the Commissioner of DOCCS, implemented the provisions of 
Executive Law § 259-c ( 4) through issuance of a DOCCS Memorandum dated October 5, 
2011. She indicated in the Memorandum that members of the Parole Board were working 
with DOCCS staff to develop a transition accountability plan, or "TAP". It is indicated that 
TAP incorporates risk and needs principles, and will provide a meaningful measurement of 
an inmate's rehabilitation. According to Commissioner Evans, the TAP instrument would 
replace the inmate status report. In the same Memorandum~ it is indicated that the Parole 
Board had been trained in usage of the Cornpas Risk and Needs Assessment tool, so that 
members of the Board could understand the interplay between the Compas instrument and 
the TAP instrument. 
Of note in this instance, the Third Department Appellate Division recently had 
opportunity to rule on a case having close similarities to the case at bar. In Matter of Garfield 
v Evans (108 AD3d 830, 2013 NY Slip Op 5029, [July 3, 2013]), the inmate's parole 
interview occurred in October 2011,just after the effective date of Executive Law§ 259-c 
( 4 ). As here, the inmate alleged that the Parole Board failed to utilize the COMP AS Risk and 
Needs Assessment instrument1• The Appellate Division stated: 
"Significantly, Executive Law § 259-c ( 4) requires that the 
Board 'establish written procedures for its use in making parole 
decisions as required by law,' and the Board acknowledges that 
1Referred to in the petition as the" Compass factors". 
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the statute requires it to incorporate risk and needs principles 
into its decision-making process. According to the record, the 
Board was trained in the use of the COMPAS instrument prior 
to petitioner's hearing. Moreover, the Board acknowledges that 
it has used the CO:rvtPAS instrument since February 2012 and 
will use it for petitioner's next appearance. Under these 
circumstances, we find no justification for the Board's failure to 
use the COMP AS instrument at petitioner's October 2011 
hearing. Accordingly, we agree with petitioner that he is 
entitled to a new hearing.[]" (id.). 
The Garfield case is directly applicable to the situation at bar. In this instance, there 
is no evidence in the record that the Parole Board utilized either the Compas instrument or 
the TAP instrument. Nor did the Parole Board make mention of a risk and peeds analysis, 
either during the parole interview, or within the parole determination. Thus, in this respect, 
there is nothing to distinguish the Parole Board's review here from the process generally 
employed by the Parole Board prior to the 2011 amendment of Executive Law§ 259-c (4). 
The Court concludes that the petition must be granted, the October 18, 2011 determination 
annulled, and the petitioner granted a new parole interview. 
The Court observes that certain records of a confidential nature relating to the 
petitioner were submitted to the Court as a part of the record. The Court, by separate order, 
is sealing all records submitted for in camera review. 
Accordingly, it is 
ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is granted; and it is 
ORDERED, that the October 18, 2011 determination of the Parole Board is annulled 
and the matter remitted to the Board of Parole for further proceedings not inconsistent with 
this Court's decision. 
This shall constitute the decision, order and j.udgment of the Court. The original 
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decision/order/judgment is returned to the attorney for the respondents. All other papers are 
being delivered by the Court to the County Clerk for filing. The signing of this 
decision/order/judgment and delivery of this decision/order/judgment does not constitute 
entry or filing under CPLR Rule 2220. Counsel is not relieved from the applicable 
provisions of that rule respecting filing, entry and notice of entry. 
ENTER \ 
Dated: September It , 2013 ~ ~ · ~ 
Troy, New York l f/L George B. Ceresia, Jr. 
Supreme Court Justice 
Papers Considered: 
1. Order To Show Cause dated May 20, 2013, Petition, Supporting Papers and 
Exhibits 
2. Respondent's Answer dated July 23, 2013, Supporting Papers and Exhibits 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
SUPREME COURT 
In The Matter of TIMOTHY GOODE, 
-ag~nst-
NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF PAROLE, 
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. 
COU1'l'IT OF ALBANY 
Resp~.m..dent, 
. .. 
Supreme Court Albany Cowity Article 78 Term 
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding 
RJI # 01-13-ST4719 Index No. 2542:.13 13 
SEALING ORDER 
T4e following ~ocuments having been filed by the ;!'.spondent with ~e Cm,ilt for in 
camera review in ~connection with the above matter, n:amely, respondent's Exhibit B~ 
Presentence Investigation Report, and respondent's Exhibit. 0, Confidential Po~ion of Inmate 
Status Report, it is hereby 
ORDERED, that the foregoing designated dgcutncnts, i~cludi~~ all du.plicates and 
copies thereof, shall be filed as sealed instruments and not,mti .~e available to any pel'Son or 
public or private agency unless by further order of the C~>J!Ji, 
Dated: 
ENTER 
September /, . , 2013 
Troy~ New York 
... 
eorge B. Ceresia, Jr. 
Supreme qourt Justice 
.... 
